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1. INTRODUCTION 
.. dis 
In the last decade increasing attention has been focused on the role 
of military expenditures in developing countries. One reason for this is that 
world military expenditures in 1987 exceeded one trillion US dollars for the 
very firsttime; developing countries accounted for approximately 17 percent 
ofthis total. Despite the steady growth in defense spending, scholars, forthe 
most part, know little about the effects of military spending on the local 
economy. As Saadat Deger (1986: 3) recently noted: "The numbers are 
mind-boggling; ... But what is clear is that it is essential to study, analytically, 
the economic dimensions of military expenditure in less developed countries 
(LOGs) and carefully evaluate the costs and benefits involved .... the 
economics of militarization are crucial. II 
Another reason forthe increased awareness of military expenditures 
is that developing countries have had to recently scrutinize the size of overall 
budgets, especially the defense component. In many cases the resource 
base has declined but the needs from other sectors of the economy have 
concomitantly increased. In many instances, defense expenditures have 
replaced high priority development projects with little knowledge on the part 
of governments as to the impact of such a decision. 
Much of the current research in the field of defense economics can be 
attributed to the early work of Emile Benoit (1978) who concluded that, 
contrary to popularopinion, developing countries which had higher defense 
burdens (defense spending as a percentage of Gross National Product 
(GNP)) usually had higher rates of economic growth. This result was 
diametrically opposite to the usually-held belief that increases in defense 
spending meant lower growth; scarce resources were siphoned away from 
more productiye uses elsewhere in the economy. 
• An eartierversion of this paper was presented in 1989 atthe Institute for Strategic and 
International Studies, Kuala Lumpur. I wish to thank two anonymous referees formaking valuable 
suggestions • 
.. Professor of Economics, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA. 
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In the last decade, other aspects of defense spending in developing 
countries have received closer attention. Some of these areas are: 
- how military spending affects rates of savings and investment, and 
consequently prospects for future growth; 
- the economic and noneconomic determinants of defense spending; 
- the determinants of arms industries; 
- the production of major weapons systems by only certain develop-
ing countries: 
- the discernible effects (both economic and noneconomic) of civilian 
versus military regimes; and 
- human capital formation and development in the military. 1 
In a recent paper, Looney and Frederiksen (1990) examined the 
determinants of defense spending in six Asian countries: the Philippines, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Their research 
suggested that economic variables and resource availability were the main 
determinants of military expenditures in these six countries. The purpose of 
this paper is to test, for the same set of countries, the widely-held hypothesis 
that the direction of causality is from military expenditures to economic 
growth, i.e., that defense spending can in fact "cause" economic growth. 
The alternative hypotheses are that (a) economic growth precedes defense 
spending, thereby allowing countries to increase defense outlays; (b) no 
relationship exists: or (c) a feedback loop exists whereby defense leads to 
growth which, in turn, leads to more defense, etc. The working hypothesis 
for this paper is that, a priori, one cannot specify the direction of causality 
for any individual country. In addition to testing the usually assumed 
hypothesis of defense to growth, this paper goes on to (a) extend the 
preliminary results obtained by Frederiksen and LaCivita (1987) on causality 
in the Philippines which originally appeared in this Journal; (b) extend the 
results obtained in LaCivita and Frederiksen (1991 ) from 1 982 to 1 988 for 
the Philippines and Thailand; and (c) include comparative research results 
for Indonesia,2 Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea. 
THE CAUSALITY ISSUE 
Most studies to date have assumed that defense spending is an 
exogenous variable and, thus, "causes" economic growth. In other words, 
the models which have been tested have specified economic growth as the 
1. For en excellent review see Deger (1986) and Lindgren (1988). 
2. The results for Indonesia converting the period 1964-85 are reported in Frederiksen 
(1989). The results for Indonesia in this paper cover the period 1961-88. 
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dependent variable. G.overnments undertake military expenditure pro" 
grams; and, presumably at some (unspecified) time in the future, the 
economy would either benefit or suffer as a result of this spending. Most of 
the studies in the 1 980s focused on whether the effect was positive, neutral, 
or negative (see Deger 1986). The widely"held belief regarding the exogeneity 
of defense spending originated with Benoit. In his seminal paper, he 
recognized that the direction of causality could be either from defense to 
growth or from growth to defense. As Benoit noted: 
A question arose, however, about the direction of this interaction. Might not 
the correlation be explained by the influence of growth rates on defense 
expenditures rather than vice versa? Countries with rapid growth might feel 
better able to indulge themselves in the luxury of elaborate defense 
programs .•.. These plausible hypotheses did not appear to be supported by 
the evidence .... Thus growth appeared to exert only a weak influence on 
defense burdens. (Benoit 1978: 275-76) 
The assumed exogeneity of defense has recently been challenged by 
Joerding (1986) who examined data for 57 countries and concluded that 
defense expenditures were not strongly exogenous. Whether or not defense 
spending promotes economic growth is important for those developing 
countries searching for ways to improve economic performance-or at least 
to spend so as not to retard economic growth. Joerding' 5 work is undoubt" 
edly an important contribution to the literature. But as was pointed out in 
Frederiksen and laCivita (1987) and LaCivita and Frederiksen (1991)' there 
are two major criticisms of Joerding's work. First, Joerding lumps all 
countries into one sample. This suggests that if a causal relationship exists 
it is common to all countries. It is quite likely that in some countries defense 
causes growth, in others growth causes defense, and yet in others a 
feedback relationship or even no relationship exists. The second point is that 
Joerding assumed a common and arbitrary four-year lag structure on the 
defense and growth variables in his pooled set. It is reasonable to assume 
that the lag structure might differ from one country to another depending on 
the structure of the economy, the type of defense spending, and the like. 
In Frederiksen and LaCivita's study (1987) of the Philippines during 
1956 and 1982 they used Joerding' s procedure (explained more fully below) 
to test for causality. No statistically significant relationship was found to exist 
between defense and growth when the lagged values forthe variables were 
arbitrarily chosen to be four years. When the model was re"estimated with 
an arbitrary lag value of two, it was found that growth causes defense. These 
initial results suggest that, since both of the lag structures tested (two and 
four years) were chosen arbitrarily, one cannot say which is the correct 
specification. 
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DATA SOURCES 
The primary data source3 0n Gross Domestic Product (GOP) and on 
the rate of growth of real GOP (except for Malaysia between 1961 and 1970) 
was the International Monetary Fund's (lMF) International Financial Statis-
tics Yearbook. The Yearbook: 1984 was used for data up to 1959, the 
Yearbook: 1990fordata between 1960 and 1 9S0, and the Yearbook: 1991 
for the period 1981 -88. Defense expenditures were drawn from the United 
Nation's Statistical Yearbook (annual issues through to 1 983/84). The rate 
of growth of real GOP was not reported by the IMF for Malaysia between 
1961 and 1970. A series was constructed using the nominal GOP adjusted 
for inflation/deflation by the Consumer Price Index (CPl). The defense 
burden through to 1 9S3 (for all countries except Singapore and Indonesia) 
was calculated as the percentage of GOP allocated to defense expendi-
tures. The defense burden data for the remaining years (1984-88) were 
reported by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) in World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (annual issues). 
A comparison of several overlapping years (Appendix A) indicated similar 
ratios for the military burden whatever the source used. 4 Defense expendi-
tures for Malaysia between 1969 and 1985 were taken from the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies' Defense Spending in Southeast Asia, (1987). The 
defense burden for Singapore was derived exclusively from ACDA data. 
The defense burden for Indonesia for the period 1961-66 was reported by 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI), SIPRI 
Yearbooks on World Armaments and Disarmament. The remaining years 
were drawn from USACDA. 
The following sections describe, respectively, the methodology by 
which the optimal lag length and correct direction of causality were calcu-
lated and the empirical results for the Philippines (1 956-SSI, Thailand (1956-
8S), South Korea (1955-88), Malaysia (1961-SS), Singapore (1967-88), and 
Indonesia (1961-88). 
METHODOLOGY 
Hsiao (1981) has developed a systematic method for choosing lag 
lengths to avoid the problems associated with arbitrary lag lengths. His 
method combines Granger causality and Akaike's final prediction error 
(FPE). Initially a series of regression equations is estimated on the depend-
3. The data used inthe study appears as Appendix A, Tables A 1-A6. 
4. Since the tests are more robust with longer periods, we feel more than justified in using 
ACDA data on the military burden for the later years especially given the similarity to the ratio 
computed (using UN and IMFdeta) for earlier years. A data sheet for each country. together with 
e copy of the computer output, is eppended to this paper. 
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ent variable. In the first regression equation, the dependent variable is 
lagged one year, and in succeeding regressions, an additional lag is added. 
That is, M regression equations are estimated in the form: 
m 
G, = a +1: P,-I G,-l + £, 
1=1 
where G is economic growth and where M, the maximum lag length, takes 
on the value from 1 to M:5 
For each regression, the final prediction error (FPE) is computed in the 
following manner: 
FPE(m) = T+m+ 1 
T-m-l 
ESS(m)IT, 
where Tis the sample size, and FPE(m) and ESS(m) are the final prediction 
error and the sum of squares, respectively. The optimal lag length, m· , is the 
lag length which produces the smallest final prediction error, i.e., the most 
accurate forecast. Once m· has been calculated, another set of regressions 
is estimated with lagged values of D, the defense variable, added sequentially 
in the same manner which was used to determine m· . Thus, six additional 
regressions are estimated in the form: 
rTf n 
Gt = a +1: Pt-l Gt-1 + 1:1,-ID,-l + E" 
;=1 ;=1 
with n taking on the values from one to six. We then compute the FPEfor 
each of these regression equations as: 
FPEfm·,n) T+m· +n+ 1 ESS(m· ,n)IT, 
T-m· -n-1 
and we choose the optimal lag length for D, n· , as the regression equation 
with the lowest prediction error. 
In the same manner, another set of equations is estimated, with D as 
the dependent variable, and lagged values of D are included to find m·. 
Then, lagged values of G are included to find n·. 
5. Although the ehoiee of Mis arbitrary, it should be es large as possible, eonsistent with 
the sample size and the underlying process. Beeause ofthe relative shortness of time series data 
for mostdsveloping oountries, M was limitsd to six years. 
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The final procedure is to test for causality, and this consists of three 
steps: 
STEP 1 : The final prediction error for the model G "" f(Gd is compared 
to the FPEforthe model G "" f(GL, Dd.lftheFPEdecreases(i.e., the model's 
predictive power increases as we add lagged values of DI, we conclude that 
defense Granger causes growth. If, on the other hand, the FPEincreases 
then we conclude that defense does not Granger cause growth. 
STEP 2: The FPEfor the model D "" flDd is compared to the FPEfor 
the model D "" f(DL, Gd. If the FPE declines, we conclude that growth 
Granger causes defense. If the FPE increases, we conclude that growth 
does not Granger cause defense. 
STEP 3: We compare the FPEs under Step 1 and Step 2. If the FPE 
increased in both cases, we conclude no relationship between D and G. If 
the FPE declines in both cases, we conclude a feedback relationship exists. 
If the FPE declined under Step 1 but increased under Step 2, we find that 
defense Granger causes growth. If the FPE increased under Step 1 but 
declined under Step 2, we find that growth Grangercauses defense. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Lag Lengths 
The optimal lag lengths using Hsiao's method on each country appear 
as Table 1 .6 The paired numbers in the first column indicate the optimum lag 
lengths, m· and n· , respectively, when economic growth is the dependent 
variable and lagged values of G and lagged values of the defense variable 
are the independent variables. The paired numbers in the second column 
indicate optimum lag lengths, m· and n·, when defense is the dependent 
variable. 
As hypothesized, the estimated optimal lag lengths differ slightly 
among the countries. While we are unable at this aggregate data level to 
specify reasons for individual lag length differences among the countries, it 
is comforting to see that most of the lag lengths are either one or two years. 
These results support the findings of Looney and Frederiksen (19901 who 
looked at the determinants of defense spending in these countries. 
Past growth of GOP has an immediate impact (one year) on current 
GOP in four of the countries. The one anomaly is a six-year lag rate for 
Malaysia, However, this result must be looked at with caution since Hsiao's 
model, while relatively consistent, tends to overestimate lag lengths. The 
6. The final prediction errors have not been reported in the peper. As noted previously. 
the results cen be obtained directly from the author. 
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Table 1 
OPTIMAL LAG LENGTHS (Years) 
, I 
Country G=f(GL , DJ D=f(DL , GJ 
Philippines (1, 1) (1, 1) 
Thailand (1, 1) (1,2) 
South Korea (1,5) (1,3) 
Malaysia (6, 1) (2,3) 
Singapore (2,2) (2, 1) 
Indonesia (1, 1) (1, 1) 
result for Malaysia, while not spurious, is probably less than the computed 
six-year computed lag. In other words, earlier rates of growth of the GOP 
have a more recent effect on current GOP growth than indicated by the 
estimated results. In addition, the six-year lag is an average over a twenty-
eight year period and is most likely considerably shorter if examined using 
only recent data. 
Importantly, the data indicate an almost immediate effect of the 
defense burden on growth: a one-year lag for all countries except Singapore 
which experiences a two-year lag (see Column 1 ) and South Korea (five-
year lag). In addition, the impact of past defense spending on current 
defense spending is immediate (one year) in four of the countries, and two 
years for Thailand and Singapore. This result also supports earlier research 
findings on the determinants of defense spending. It appears as if the 
"jumping off point" for the current military budget is either the military burden 
or the growth rate in GOP of the preceding year. Past GOP growth rates have 
a one-year lagged impact on defense for the Philippines, Singapore and 
Indonesia. Past GOP from two years ago impacts the current defense 
budget in Thailand, and the impact is three years for South Korea and 
Malaysia. 
DEFENSE/GROWTH RELATIONSHIPS 
The final step in the procedure is to compare the final prediction error 
tor the regression equations to determine causality, if any. The relationships 
appear in Table 2. 
For a half of the sample, the data suggest a clear direction of causality: 
from economic growth to defense for Malaysia and from defense to growth 
for Singapore and Indonesia. For the remaining three countries there is 
either no relationship between growth and defense (Philippines and South 
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Table 2 












Growth to Defense 
Defense Granger causes Growth 
Defense Granger causes Growth 
Korea) or a feedback loop (Thailand). As noted above, the aggregative 
nature of the data prohibits us from identifying the specific defense expendi-
ture which causes the economic growth or even the timing of the economic 
growth which induces the follow-on defense spending. This is primarily due 
to the examination of data for a thirty-year period. Presumably, for Singa-
pore and Indonesia, the existence of a large arms industry (especially in the 
case of Singapore) or of growth-inducing types of military spending ("on 
infrastructure, education, housing, and the like) has had positive effects on 
the economy. These are the effects that Benoit suggested might take place 
in developing economies. For Malaysia the final prediction error suggests 
that economic growth is an important determinant of defense spending, 
which is opposite to the pattern suggested by Benoit. For Thailand, the final 
prediction error declined when G and 0 were the respective dependent 
variables. This suggests a "feedback" relationship whereby growth has led 
to more defense which, in turn, has created more growth, and so on. This 
was the predominant case in the larger study conducted by LaCivita and 
Frederiksen (1991). For two of the countries, the Philippines and South 
Korea, the results indicate no relationship between defense and growth. For 
Korea this is somewhat puzzling given the often perceived importance of the 
defense sector in economic development. However, this result might be due 
to the inclusion of relatively recent data (through to 1988) in the model; 
Korea's growth in the last decade or so may no longer depend on the 
defense sector (as much as it did earlier), and other factors (such as 
technological advances and economic diversity) have been the main 
engines of growth. For the Philippines, as in the case of Korea, the inclusion 
of the defense burden as an independent variable (with G as the dependent 
variable) or the inclusion of G as an independent variable when D was the 
dependent variable led to increases in the final prediction error; defense 
expenditures in the Philippines apparently have no Granger causality effect 
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on economic growth, and growth does not "cause" defense. Presumably 
either pattern could have happened (or is happening) if we were to take 
stlorter periods within the thirty-year period. Unfortunately the shorter the 
time period examined, the weaker is the statistical test. 
From a policy point of view, planners in South Korea and the Philip-
pines should therefore not rely on defense expenditures as a major policy 
tool for economic growth in their respective economies. The implication of 
these results is that any effort to impose arbitrary lag lengths along the lines 
of Joerding on models which try to uncover causality will likely hide the true 
relationship. The appropriate relationship can only be detected by a proper 
specification of the model, and the appropriate relationship will more than 
likely differ from one country to another-an assumption not felt likely by 
earlier authors such as Benoit. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined the defense/growth causality issue for six 
Asian countries. The purpose was (a) to extend an earlier paper in this 
Journal dealing with lag lengths in the Philippines; (b) to update prior 
causality studies on the Philippines and Thailand through 1988; and (c) to 
include comparative studies on Indonesia, South Korea, Singapore, and 
Malaysia. 
Most past studies have assumed that defense spending precedes or 
"ca~es" economic growth-i.e., that correlation implies causation. Joerding 
suggested that defense spending is not exogenous. The two criticisms of the 
Joerding paper were that (a) he used a pooled sample, and (b) he chose an 
arbitrary lag structure. 
This six-country study determined on a country-by-country basis the 
oPtimal lag structure for the defense and growth variables, on the one hand, 
and the appropriate direction of causality for each country, on the other 
hand. 
The results indicate that the lag structure differs from country to 
country as hypothesized. However, when broadly examined, the lag lengths 
are primarily one or two years. The similarity is further strengthened when 
one considers that the model used in this paper tends to overestimate the 
lag period. Past growth and past defense have an almost immediate impact 
on current growth, and Similarly, past defense and past growth have a very 
quick impact on current defense. 
The results also confirmed that the causal relationship differs from 
country to country. For Singapore and Indonesia the results indicate that 
defense Granger causes defense-the presumed direction according to 
Benoit. Only in Malaysia did economic growth appear to be a determinant 
of defense spending. In the case of Thailand our results suggest a feedback 
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relationship; for the remaining two countries-Philippines and South 
Korea-no discernible relationship between defense and growth was uncov-
erect. 
The Implication for further research is that neither defense or growth 
can be considered as exogenously determined. Furthermore, we do not 
expect one model to fit all countries or even a group of countries In the same 
region. The lag lengths are likely to differ from country to country, as does 
the causal relationship between the defense burden and economic growth. 
Given the complexity of the interaction of the defense and growth variables, 
a fruitful area for future research might be to uncover exactly how defense 
affects growth on a country-by-country and year-by-year basis-a task 
made difficult due to the aggregative nature of the reported data. Given 
further breakdowns as to the types of military spending (on, for example, 
capital equipment or R&D), more complete insights might be uncovered as 
to the role of military expenditures on the economy. 
APPENDIX A 
Table Ai 
DATA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 
Gross Defense Defense USACDA Growth rate 
Year Domestic expend- burden defense of real GDP 
Product- itureb (percent) burden (percent) (percent) 
1956 10 166 1.6 6.9 
1957 11 157 1.4 5.3 
1958 12 181 1.5 3.5 
1959 13 181 1.4 6.7 
1960 14 190 1.4 1.5 
1961 15 197 1.3 5.6 
1962 17 206 1.2 4.8 
1963 20 209 1.0 7.0 
1964 21 230 1.1 3.5 
1965 23 225 1.0 5.2 
1966 26 249 1.0 4.4 
1967 29 290 1.0 6.1 
1968 32 345 1.1 5.6 
1969 35 326 0.9 4.8 
1970 42 458 1.1 4.6 
1971 50 543 1.1 4.9 
1972 56 602 1.1 4.8 
1973 72 855 1.2 9.2 
1974 100 1941 1.9 5.0 
1975 115 3982 3.5 6.4 
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Table A1 (continued) 
Gross Defense Defense USACDA Growth rate 
Year Domestic expend- burden defense of real GOP 
Product- itureb (percent) burden (percent) (percent) 
1976 135 4118 3.1 8.0 
1977 '154 4325 2.8 6.1 
1978 178 3552 2.0 2.0 5.5 
1979 218 4995 2.3 2.3 6.3 
1980 265 5115 1.9 1.9 5.2 
1981 305 5526 1.8 1.8 3.2 
1982 341 5552 1.6 1.7 3.6 
1983 384 6106 1.6 1.6 1.9 
1984 1.2 -7.6 
1985 1.3 -7.4 
1986 1.9 3.4 
1987 1.8 4.8 
1988 1.7 6.3 
a. Billions of pesos. 
b. Millions of pesos, 
Sources: GOP and Growth Rate of Real GOP: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook: 1984 (1956-1959). Yeamook: 1990 (1960-1980). Yearbook: 1991 (1981-1988). 1956-
1983 Defense Expenditures from United Nations. Statistical Yearbook, Annual Issues. Defense 
Burden (1918-1988) from USACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers: 1989. 
Table A2 
DATA, THAILAND 
Gross Defense Defense USACDA Growth rate 
Year Domestic expend- burden defense of real GOP 
Producta itureb (percent) burden (percent) (percent) 
1956 43 817 1.9 6 
1957 44 1567 3.6 
-1.6 
1958 45 1390 3.1 3.4 
1959 48 1421 3.0 6.9 
1960 54 1378 2.6 10.0 
1961 59 1080 1.8 5.3 
1962 63 1570 2.5 8.1 
1963 68 1609 2.4 8.4 
1964 75 1745 2.3 6.6 
1965 84 1877 2.2 7.9 
1966 101 2055 2.0 12.2 
1967 108 2437 2.3 7.8 
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Table A2 (continued) 
Gross Defense Defense USACDA Growth rate 
Year Domestic expend- burden defense of real GDP 
Product- itureb (percent) burden (percent) (percent) 
1968 117 2990 2.6 8.5 
1969 129 3638 2.8 7.9 
1970 147 4898 3.3 10.5 
1971 153 5383 3.5 5.0 
1972 170 5721 3.4 4.1 
1973 222 5950 2.7 9.9 
1974 279 7104 2.5 4.4 
1975 303 7870 2.6 4.8 
1976 347 9987 2.9 9.4 
1977 403 12566 3.1 9.9 
1978 488 17367 3.6 3.6 10.4 
1979 559 22978 4.1 4.2 5.3 
1980 659 27019 4.1 4.1 4.8 
1981 760 29143 3.8 3.9 6.3 
1982 820 33652 4.1 4.2 4.1 
1983 910 34944 3.8 3.9 7.3 
1984 3.9 7.1 
1985 4.4 3.5 
1986 3.9 4.9 
1987 3.5 9.5 
1988 3.1 13.2 
a. Billions of baht. 
b. Millions of baht. 
Sources: GOP and Growth Rate of Real GOP: IMF,lnternational Financial Statistics 
Yearbooks: 1984 (1956-1959), Yearbook: 1990(1960-1980), YBBrbook: 1991 (1 981-1 988). 
1956-1983 Defense Expenditures from United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, Annual Issues. 
Defense Burden 1978-1988 from USACDA, World MllltaryExpendlturssandArrT1$ Transfers, 
1989. 
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Table A3 
DATA, SOUTH KOREA 
Gross Defense Defense USACDA Growth rate 
Year Domestic expend- burden defense of real GDP 
Product- iture- (percent) burden (percent) (percent) 
1955 113 6 5.3 4.5 
1956 150 11 7.3 
-1.3 
1957 196 11 5.6 7.6 
1958 203 13 6.4 5.5 
1959 216 14 6.5 3.9 
1960 243 15 6.2 1.2 
1961 291 17 5.8 5.8 
1962 352 21 6.0 2.1 
1963 500 20 4.0 9.1 
1964 711 25 3.5 9.7 
1965 798 30 3.8 5.7 
1966 1024 41 4.0 12.2 
1967 1259 50 4.0 5.9 
1968 1630 65 4.0 11.3 
1969 2130 84 3.9 13.8 
1970 2724 101 3.7 8.8 
1971 3379 136 4.0 9.2 
1972 4170 171 4.1 5.9 1973 5416 181 3.3 14.4 
1974 7569 254 3.4 7.9 
1975 10224 194 1.9 6.5 
1976 1~996 . 771 5.5 13.2 
1977 18074 1008 5.6 10.9 
1978 24327 1438 5.9 9.7 1979 31323 1597 5.1 7.4 1980 38041 2252 5.9 
-2.0 1981 47482 2831 6.0 6.7 1982 54443 3163 5.8 7.3 
1983 63833 3405 5.3 11.8 1984 5.1 9.4 1985 5.1 6.9 1986 4.8 12.4 1987 4.4 12.0 1988 4.3 11.5 
a. Billions of won 
Sources: GOP and Growth Rate of Real GOP: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
YHIbooks: 1984 (1955-1959), Yeamook: 1990 (1960-1980) Yearbook: 1991 (1981-1988). 
Defense Expenditures from United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, Annual Issues. Defense 
Burden (1984-1988) from USACOA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers: 1989. 




Gross Defense Defense USACOA Growth Consumer 
Year Domestic expend- burden 
defense rate of Price 
Product& iture& (percent) burden real GOP Index (percent) (percent) 
1961 6696 108.8 1.6 -2.1 97 
1962 7056 127.4 1.8 5.4 97 
1963 7515 154.9 2.1 3.3 100 
1964 8056 216.5 2.7 7.2 100 
1965 8837 303.1 3.4 8.6 101 
1966 9394 ;379.5 4.0 6.3 101 
1967 9774 366.6 3.8 6.1 99 
1968 10160 379.3 3.7 3.9 99 
1969 11629 329.6 2.8 15.6 98 
1970 12155 436.7 3.6 2.4 100 
1971 12955 546.0 4.2 7.1 102 
1972 14220 707.6 5.0 9.4 
1973 18723 725.3 3.9 11.7 
1974 22858 954.7 4.2 8;3 
1975 22332 1053.8 4.7 0.8 
1976 28085 1117.2 4.0 11.6 
1977 32340 1324.0 4.1 7.8 
1978 37886 1406.0 3.7 6.7 
1979 46424 1704.0 3.7 9.3 
1980 53308 2253.0 4.2 7.4 
1981 57613 3332.0 5.8 6.9 
1982 62579 3694.0 5.9 5.9 
1983 69941 3489.0 5.0 6.3 
1984 79550 2626.4 3.3 7.8 
1985 77547 1850.2 2.4 -1.0 
1986 4.2 1.0 
1987 4.5 5.4 
1988 2.8 -0.1 
a. Millionsof ringgit 
Note: Only 1960-88 data used. Real GDP for earlier years unavailable. 
Sources: GDP (1960-1970) and Consumer Price Index (1961-1970) from IMF, Intema-
tionaiFinancia/Statistics Yearbook: 1990. Defense Expenditures 1961-68from United Nations, 
Statistical YearDook, Annual Issues. Defense Expenditures 1969-1985 from Defence Spending 
in Southeast Asia, ed. Chin Kin Wah (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), 
p.174. Defense Burden 1986-1988 from USACDA, World Military Expendffures and Arms 
Transfers, 1989. Growth Rate of Real GDP for 1961 - 1970 computed by taking current GDP and 
adjusting using Consumer Price Index; for 1971-1988 from International Financial Statistics 
YearDook: 1990. 
FREDERIKSEN: GROWTH AND DEFENSE SPENDING 145 
Table AS 
DATA, SINGAPORE 
U$ACDA Growth rate 
Year defense of real GOP 
burden (percent) (percent) 
1967 2.1 11.8 
1968 2.8 13.9 
1969 6;0 13.7 
1970 8.8 13.7 
1971 7.8 12.5 
1972 6.0 13.4 
1973 5.2 1.5 
1974 4.7 6.3 
1975 5.0 4.1 
1976 5.5 7.5 
1977 6.2 7.8 
1978 5.3 8.6 
1979 4.9 9.3 
1980 5.2 9.7 
1981 5.3 9.6 
1982 5.1 6.9 
1983 4.2 8.2 
1984 5.2 8.3 
1985 5.9 
-1.7 
1986 5.5 2.0 
1987 5.1 9.4 
1988 5.3 11.1 
Sources: Defense Burden from USACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trans-
fenl, annual issues. Growth Rate of Real GOP, 1967-1980 from IMF, International Financial 
Statistics Yearbooks: 1984; 1981-1988 from Yearbook: 1991. 
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Table A6 
DATA, INDONESIA 
Defense Growth rate 
Year burden of real GOP 
(percent) (percent) 
1961 6.3 5.1 
1962 4.6 2.4 
1963 2.9 -2.4 
1964 2.0 5.5 
1965 2.2 0.0 
1966 1.2 2.3 
1967 2.6 2.3 
1968 3.1 11.1 
1969 3.2 6.0 
1970 3.3 7.5 
1971 3.5 7.0 
1972 3.4 9.4 
1973 2.9 11.3 
1974 2.9 7.6 
1975 3.8 5.0 
1976 3.5 6.9 
1977 3.3 8.8 
1978 3.3 7.8 
1979 3.3 6.3 
1980 3.1 9.9 
1981 3.2 7.9 
1982 3.2 2.2 
1983 2.7 4.2 
1984 2.6 7.0 
1985 2.4 2.5 
1986 2.5 5.9 
1987 2.1 4.1 
1988 1.8 6.5 
Sources: Defense Burden (1961-1966): Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute, SIRPI Yearbook 1990, World Annaments and Disarmaments, (Oxford University Press, 
1990) Table SA.a. 1967- 1988 from USACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 
annual issues. Growth Rate of Real GOP (1961-1980) from IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbooks: 1984; 1981-1988 from Yearbook: 1991. 
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